



Purpose: This paper aims to highlight and encourage consideration of the ethical and in some 
instances legal implications of managerial change in the EPL which often gets overlooked 
and sidestepped by clubs.  
Design/methodology/approach: Extant literature relating to managerial change is identified 
and discussed to provide the foundations of the discussion of whether managerial change in 
the EPL which is primarily focused on performance outcome, is neglecting ethical and legal 
issues. 
Findings: The loophole that exists in the Employment Rights Act (1996) allows clubs to 
instantly dismiss a manager and consequently not see out their notice period as agreed in their 
contract or the statutory notice period. Whilst legally clubs are at will to act in this manner, 
the instability of EPL management evident today appears to have taken away the rights of an 
employee.   
Practical implications: Greater consideration of the current managerial change practices in 
EPL from an ethical and legal perspective appears warranted. The incomparable rights that a 
player and a manger have relating to their tenure at a club seem somewhat unfair. 
Originality/value: Presents thought-provoking information relating to managerial change in 
the EPL which appears to have been overlooked in the literature to date which primarily 
focuses on the impact of change on performance.  
Keywords: Managerial Change, English Premier League, employment rights 







The apparently unique nature of professional team sports and leagues dictates that individual 
teams, while seeking a dominant position in a winner-takes-all scenario, require competitors 
to provide opposition, entertainment and commercial possibility (Williams, 2012). For this 
reason, professional sports can be lucrative business, presenting many opportunities for 
revenue generation (Madichie, 2009). However, with rising revenues come rising costs for 
player recruitment and salaries and an increase in pressure to deliver results with a degree of 
immediacy. 
 
Professional sport is littered with examples of successful and long-serving managers. Fred 
Everiss, responsible for West Bromwich Albion (UK) coached his team over 46 years (1902–
1948) without any interruption. Sir Alex Ferguson, by many the most successful manager in 
the modern footballing era, was in charge of Manchester United for 26 years before taking 
the decision to retire, while others, Alan Curbishley at Charlton Athletic (15 years) and 
Arsene Wenger at Arsenal (18 years) have been appointed for similar periods. In other 
professional sports tenure seems to be much shorter. In English Rugby Union, Jim Mallinder, 
Director of Rugby for Northampton Saints has been in charge for 7 years. However, as 
indicated by Heuer, Muller, Ruber, Hangemann and Strauss (2011), such loyalty is very 
unusual in professional team sports. More often than not the tenure of a manager of a 
professional club is short with action being taken to sack a manager when there have been a 
string of bad results, or when the 'fans turn' on the clubs hierarchy. Indeed, in relation to the 
examples from professional football above, even Alan Curbishley was sacked as manager of 
Charlton Athletic when there was a downturn in results despite him being the club's manager 
for 15 years. The examples of long-serving managers such as Ferguson and Wenger both 
occur at clubs that have ultimately been successful during the last two decades. Such success, 
it can be argued, has made these managers less prone to the pressure of the sack even if 
results don’t always go their way. Furthermore, Sir Alex Ferguson, clearly one of the 
exceptions in the world of football managers, left the club on his own terms, retiring in 2013. 
There is little evidence presently to suggest that football clubs stand by their manager in bad 
times. In fact, according to many there is an unhealthy churn of managers with sacked 
managers and coaches hired by competitors who have dismissed their own coach in order to 
appoint someone else (e.g. Audas, Dobson and Goddard, 2002; Dobson and Goddard, 2011; 




By way of an example we can point to Andre Villas-Boas’ sacking by Chelsea after less than 
a year in charge at Stamford Bridge. The 34-year-old manager was sacked for results and 
performances not being good enough and showing no signs of improvement. He later moved 
to Tottenham Hotspur where he lasted 16 months before his contract was terminated. In both 
cases, clubs replaced the manager with interim appointments who were also fired. This 
volatile approach to the hiring and firing of club managers and head coaches has led to media 
outlets and pundits fashioning the phrase regarding a “Premier League sack race”. 
 
The primary focuses of previous research examining the impacts of managerial change in 
football are performance and finance (e.g., Flint et al., 2014). Arguably, this has occurred due 
to the globalisation and 'financial muscle' and increasing brand value of the EPL and its clubs 
which has enabled multi-billion pound television rights to be sold and multi-million pound 
sponsorship deals to be signed (Madichie, 2009; Ratten, 2011a, Ratten and Ratten, 2011). 
The unique brand image that clubs from the EPL have been able to build following on-field 
success and attractive football (e.g. Manchester United's unprecedented 13 EPL titles 
between 1992 and 2013) has delivered new commercial opportunities that are now are 
inextricably linked to playing performance and by definition the role of the football manager. 
Any reduction in on-pitch performance can damage a football club's brand and consequently 
its financial security. The selection of the right manager therefore extends beyond the 
management of 11 players in the modern day game to a range of other management functions. 
As Ferrand and Pages (1999) indicate, sport clubs are becoming more preoccupied with their 
image. There is an increasing recognition that image has the power to influence behaviours of 
all those involved with a sport organisation, its members, fans, journalists, sponsors and so on. 
This increases the pressure on clubs to change their manager, often for reasons other than on-
pitch performance. 
 
To our knowledge no research to date has considered the ethical implications that warrant 
attention given the importance of such decisions. The purpose of this article is to highlight 
that the ethics of managerial change in the EPL is often overlooked and in some cases it may 
be argued that clubs are acting in an unethical manner, breaching contract agreements and 
dismissing a manger unfairly. Clubs appear to be able to sidestep this law outlined in the 
Employment Rights Act (1996) by financially agreeing for a manager to leave the club 
without working their notice. The article is put forward as a viewpoint paper and is similar in 
structure and layout to other viewpoint papers in the field of sport business management (e.g. 
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Haskins, 2013). Three key factors prompt this article; managerial churn in the English 
Premier League, controllable and uncontrollable factors that professional football managers 
face, and employee dismissal legislation in the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
In business, the majority of organisations will encounter changes in leadership at some point 
in time. Often, as stated by Tena and Forrest (2007) there is a natural time for a change. For 
example, following an unsuccessful election campaign a political party may change their 
leader, whilst in a business setting leadership may be changed due to the expiration of a Chief 
Executive Officer's (CEO) contract or when that person reaches a certain age. In a 
professional sport team, the most logical time for a change would appear to be at the end of a 
season. However, this does not appear to be the approach taken by professional football clubs 
and, in any case, there are a number of differences between the term leader and manager in a 
professional sporting context as described by Flint et al. (2014). For example, in a 
professional football club, the leader will be the owner or the chairman, responsible for 
making decisions based on the overall strategic direction of the club and a number of off-field 
performance indicators whereas the manager will be responsible for the on-pitch performance 
of the players (Flint et al., 2014). The role of the manager is always thought to be that of 
formulating the purpose (visions, aims, goals, objectives, performance targets) of the 
organisation and controlling its movement into the future (Stacey, 2003). It is recognised that 
this cannot always be perfectly achieved but it is thought that managers need to be in control, 
to design and use systems that ultimately lead to the aims, goals and objectives being 
achieved (Stacey, 2003). Additionally, managers need to show entrepreneurial skills and 
demonstrate the ability to be innovative and show initiative (Ratten, 2011b). This is 
particularly important in sport as sports teams, organisations, players and managers have to 
develop new strategies to improve their performance (Ratten, 2011b).  
 
It is highlighted that the role of the football manager is one of chronic insecurity (Dobson and 
Goddard, 2011) and despite the argument that there is a logical time for a change in 
leadership, many professional football clubs change managers at more unconventional times. 
This highlights the diverse nature of the football industry in the global market place and the 
increasing amount of pressure placed on the football manager. This article attempts to explore 
some of these pressures and offers discussion on the factors that ultimately leads to the 




Managerial Churn in the English Premier League 
The English Premier League (EPL) was formed in 1992 when clubs in the football league's 
First Division decided to break away from the traditional Football League in order to take 
advantage of the lucrative potential of the growing market (Madichie, 2009). The league 
operates on an open system including promotion and relegation and currently comprises of 20 
teams. Since the inception of the EPL 46 clubs have competed in it (correct at the 2014/15 
season) although only five clubs have ever won the title - Arsenal, Blackburn Rovers, 
Chelsea, Manchester United and Manchester City. It may be perceived from this statistic that 
the league is not very competitive in terms of the title yet there is little doubt that the league 
has been a tremendous success throughout the last 22 years in terms of a global audience and 
revenue. 
 
The most recent set of figures available at the time of writing indicate that the 'big five' (the 
English Premier League in England, the Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, Serie A in 
Italy and Ligue 1 in France) leagues' revenues grew to €9.8 billion in 2012/13, with all five 
leagues experiencing growth (Deloitte, 2014). Of these five leagues, the English Premier 
League (EPL) is currently the highest revenue-generating league (€2.9 billion in 2012/13). 
This figure is almost €1 billion more than the next best revenue-generating league in Europe 
(the Bundesliga in Germany). Furthermore, England's Football League Championship (the 
league below the EPL) is positioned eighth in Europe, behind only the 'big 5', Russia and 
Turkey with total revenues of €508m (Deloitte, 2014). Moreover, the EPL has a greater reach 
into the global market than any other European league. EPL domestic broadcasting rights 
contracts will generate around £3.4 billion over the three seasons from 2013/14 (an increase 
of around 60% on the previous cycle) whilst overseas broadcast rights covering over 200 
countries will generate £2.2 billion during the same period (an increase of over 50% on the 
previous cycle; Deloitte, 2014). 
 
Such increases in broadcasting payments have been a significant driver in the growth of the 
EPL. The latest broadcasting agreement equates to an extra £25m for each EPL club 
compared to the previous deal owing to the league's long established central revenue 
distribution mechanism (Deloitte, 2013). Additionally, clubs relegated from the EPL are 
entitled to parachute payments worth a combined £60m over four years following relegation. 
This is undoubtedly a substantial amount although staying in the league itself is still the most 
beneficial option. For example, in 2013/14, West Bromwich Albion finished 17th, one place 
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above the relegation zone, and still received almost £66m in revenue from the broadcasting 
deal alone. Indeed, each position in the EPL has been estimated to be worth £750,000 on 
average in recent seasons in merit payments relating to broadcasting deals (The Football 
Association Premier League Limited, 2012). Furthermore, within the EPL itself there are 
additional revenue streams available to clubs such as increased sponsorship and commercial 
potential as well as performance-related bonuses. With this in mind, the pressures of being a 
manager in the EPL are evident. Such pressures may also be attributed to the number of 
managerial changes in football clubs in the EPL as opposed to other businesses and industries. 
This would certainly appear to be the case in relation to the number of managerial changes in 
the EPL since its inception in 1992. Indeed, since 1992 there has been an average of eight 
managerial changes within the EPL each season through either the sacking, resignation or 
poaching of a manager by another club. In certain seasons there have been more changes than 
others (the highest number of changes was 15 in 1994/95 and the lowest number of changes 
occurred in the following season with 3 changes in 1995/96). Overall, however, there has 
been an increasing trend of managerial change in the EPL as evidenced in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Previous Studies on Managerial Change in Football 
There have been many papers written from an academic perspective that have focused on 
managerial change in professional football in European leagues such as the EPL, Dutch 
Eredivisie, German Bundesliga, Spanish La Liga and Italian Serie A (see Audas, Dobson and 
Goddard, 2002; Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003; Hope, 2003; Koning, 2003; Tena and 
Forrest, 2007; Frick and Simmons, 2008; De Paola and Scoppa, 2011; Gonzalez-Gomez et al., 
2011; Bell, Brooks and Markham, 2013). However, many of these papers focus on the impact 
of managerial change on performance and there has been very little research on the factors 
that influence the decision to replace a manager in the first instance. It has previously been 
noted that the role of the football manager is one of chronic insecurity and the financial 
rewards for sporting success in the modern game means that football managers are under 
constant pressure to deliver results. With this in mind, an important issue is what factors 
actually influence the decision to replace a manager. In this area, to the author's knowledge 
there is very little research that has been conducted. In relation to the papers cited above, only 
Hope (2003) offers any suggestions for certain factors that relate to when is the most 
appropriate time to replace a manager. Hope's model proposes three core factors with regard 
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to managerial performance: 1) the honeymoon period (length of the honeymoon period in 
which a manager is exempt from being sacked); 2) the trapdoor (average number of points 
accumulated per game); 3) and the weight (the most recent games will be given significant 
weight in analysing the manager's performance). 
 
If we focus on one of these measures (the trapdoor) then some interesting case illustrations 
can be drawn from EPL manager performance in recent seasons. We exclude factors 1 and 3 
here from Hope's model based on the statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean. In 
relation to changing a football manager, it has been argued that the perceived honeymoon 
period and the weight if the most recent games are outweighed by the principle of regression 
to the mean. It is this phenomenon which is taking place when we witness a small 
improvement in performance immediately after a new manager is appointed (Bruinshoofd 
and ter Weel, 2003). Crucially, however, this marginal improvement in performance may 
have happened regardless of the sacking, suggesting that it may have been more beneficial 
for the clubs to retain their managers rather than be faced with substantial compensation fees. 
In relation to the trapdoor factor, Hope (2003) suggests a trapdoor of 0.74 points per game. 
Should a manager fall under 0.74 points per game, then a sacking should be considered. 
Analysing some of the most recent successful managerial campaigns in the EPL highlights 
some interesting findings in relation to this measure. For example, Martin O'Neill resigned as 
manager of Aston Villa in 2010 following media pressure and perceived poor on-pitch 
performance, yet his points per game figure during his reign was 1.55. Furthermore, in the 19 
games before O'Neill was appointed and the 19 games after his dismissal, Aston Villa's points 
per game was actually 1.11. There are further high profile examples in recent years where 
managers have been dismissed despite recording a higher points per game figure (PPG) of 
0.74 (Roberto Mancini at Manchester City (2.05 PPG), Rafael Benetiz at Liverpool (1.90 
PPG), Roberto Di Matteo at Chelsea (1.83 PPG), Harry Redknapp at Tottenham Hotspur 
(1.73 PPG)) suggesting that the trapdoor figure provided in Hope's model is not being used as 
a tool for consideration of when a manager should be relieved of their duties. These examples 
also suggest that the dismissal of these managers was ill-advised if the focus was exclusively 
on points per game as an indicator of performance. 
 
Thus, there are numerous other factors that will therefore affect the decision to replace a 
manager and it is important that these are considered, both for the club itself and the 
managers. To that end, this paper offers a viewpoint on the factors influencing managerial 
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change with reference to high profile examples from the EPL. A number of these factors are 
now discussed in turn in the following sections of the paper. 
 
Controllable factors 
The majority of research to date focuses on the impact of managerial change on performance. 
There is a lack of literature on the factors that contribute to a manager being dismissed. Part 
of the purpose of the paper is to introduce some of these factors and consider the ethical and 
moral implications. To assist with this discussion, we have divided the factors into two 
sections; controllable and uncontrollable. These factors are outlined in table 1 and discussed 
in turn with references to the extant literature. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
End of contract 
The most logical time for a change and management, as suggested by Tena and Forrest 
(2007), is at the end of a specified period of time (i.e. the end of a contract). The manager can 
control this because it is time bound and all parties are aware of the terms of the contract. 
However, in professional football, more and more contracts in the modern day game have 
clauses inserted in them that give less security to the terms of the contract. Many of these are 
performance related and the role of the football manager is ultimately to maintain a high level 
of on-pitch performance. Subsequently, it is very rare in the present day football industry that 
a manager will be dismissed purely because their contract has expired. More often than not, a 
change in a manager is through a forced dismissal or retirement. 
 
Poor managerial skills/performance 
The main objective of a professional football club is a simple one. Football clubs are judged 
by their performance on the pitch with emphasis on winning the match, obtaining three points 
and moving up the league table as a result. Flint et al. (2014) stated that the main role of the 
football manager is controlling and maintaining on-pitch performance. Thus, if the club is not 
winning matches and not progressing, the blame is often directed towards the manager. 
Football managers are aware of the importance of winning football matches as part of their 
job role, making the performance of the club a controllable factor to some extent. Obviously, 
there are other elements that will affect on-pitch performance although these are often outside 
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of the football managers' control. A number of these factors suggested in this paper are 




The Bosman ruling heralded the arrival of free agency in the European footballers' labour 
market. Such an influx of overseas talent has generally been perceived to have improved the 
quality of playing standards in the EPL. However, the liberalisation of rules governing 
football's labour market has greatly widened disparities between the earnings capability of the 
top players and the rest (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). The Bosman ruling has meant that 
players seeking a new contract or a new club are in a stronger position to bargain for high 
remuneration when negotiating new deals. Subsequently, this has ultimately led to the rise of 
player power and players often influencing decisions taken at managerial level. It is not 
unusual in the modern day game for players to be earning more than the manager and this has 
implications for the power and hierarchical relationships within a professional football club. 
In the past there have been high profile instances of a breakdown in the relationship between 
the player and the manager. For example, Sir Alex Ferguson once allegedly kicked a boot in 
the dressing room that hit David Beckham in the face and Alan Shearer was very vocal as a 
player about how much he disliked the Newcastle manager at the time Ruud Gullit. In the 
first instance, owing to the power that Sir Alex Ferguson held at Old Trafford, it was actually 
the player (Beckham) that ended up being transferred to Real Madrid but there were rumours 
that when David Moyes was sacked by the same club in April 2013 that there was an element 
of player influence in the decision. 
 
Such influences add increased pressure for the football manager that might not be present in a 
number of other industries and organisations. Admittedly, it is unusual for everyone in an 
organisation to get on with each other all of the time but it rare to see reflections of the 
hierarchical nature professional football clubs in other businesses where other employees can 
have such a powerful undermining effect on the manager, who by definition should be in a 
position of relative strength. 
 
Changes in Ownership Structure 
The relationship between ownership structure and business performance has been examined 
extensively in corporate finance literature (Wilson, Plumley and Ramchandani, 2013). 
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Ownership structure is considered an important tool for corporate governance to resolve any 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Hu and Izumida, 2008). However, 
in relation to the professional football industry, often any conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers results in the manager being dismissed. It is acknowledged in the 
paper by Wilson et al. (2013) that the ownership systems in place at professional football 
clubs are vastly different to those in place in more 'traditional' businesses and industries. 
Furthermore, the EPL in particular has seen an increase in foreign ownership in recent years 
(see Walters and Hamil, 2010; Wilson et al., 2013). Given the sheer revenue that the league 
generates and the opportunity for increased global commercial activities alluded to earlier, it 
is not surprising that the EPL has attracted considerable outside investment. In the mid-1990s 
investment came from city institutions, around the millennium it came from media companies 
and most recently investment has come from wealthy individual owners. 
 
Increasingly, these wealthy individuals owners come from overseas, further underlining the 
global appeal of the EPL. Although Mohammed Al-Fayed purchased Fulham Football Club 
in 1997, the first major occurrence of foreign investment in the EPL was Russian billionaire 
Roman Abramovich's purchase of Chelsea Football Club in 2003 and since then there has 
been a steady influx of foreign investors at EPL clubs (the Glazers at Manchester United, 
John W. Henry at Liverpool, Randy Lerner at Aston Villa and the Abu Dhabi royal family at 
Manchester City to name a few). Indeed, at the time of writing, 10 of the 20 EPL have 
majority shareholders that are foreign (equivalent to 50% of clubs in the league). In some 
ways, the acquisition of Chelsea by the Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich in 2003 
heralded a return to a more traditional model of football club ownership and finance, albeit on 
a far more extravagant scale than had ever been witnessed previously, in English football or 
elsewhere (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). 
 
However, what has not remained traditional in relation to the influx of investment is the 
stability of the football manager's job. With reference to the aforementioned Abramovich, 
Chelsea has had ten different managers since the Russian acquired the club with eleven 
managerial changes in total (Jose Mourinho returned to the role in June 2013 having 
previously managed the club from June 2004 to September 2007). That is equivalent to at 
least one managerial change per year and supports the argument that the role of the football 
manager is one of chronic insecurity (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). There have also been 
further instances of an increasing number of managerial dismissals at clubs that have been 
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taken over by foreign investors. Manchester City have had four different managers since the 
Abu Dhabi royal family took over in September 2008 and Manchester United went against 
their principles of giving a new manager time to adjust in the post-Sir Alex Ferguson era by 
sacking David Moyes after just 10 months in charge and replacing him with Louis Van Gaal 
in the summer of 2014. Perhaps the most bizarre example is at Leeds United. New owner 
Massimo Cellini (who acquired the club in April 2014) disposed of a manager just six games 
into a new season. Furthermore, during his time as owner of Cagliari Football Club in Italy, 
Cellini sacked 36 managers during his 22-year reign (BBC, 2014). Admittedly, some of these 
are extreme examples at one end of a continuum but it appears that ownership structure does 
play a part in the decision to sack a manager. This is ultimately an uncontrollable factor for 
the football manager and one that any manager will have to contend with upon taking up the 
role. Arguably, this factor is more pronounced at a club with a wealthy benefactor or large 
revenues and cash reserves as the owner is less concerned with the cost of compensation 
should they wish to disperse with a manager. This appeared to be the case with David Moyes 
at Manchester United. The club reportedly ended up settling a compensation fee of around 
£5m with David Moyes upon termination of his contract. However, the club subsequently 
missed out on a minimum of around £25m that they would have been paid had they finished 
in the top four and qualified for the Champions League. If David Moyes' successor returns 
them to this competition following the 2014/15 season then the £5m cost of compensation 
may not feel like a substantial loss. 
 
Financial rewards 
As previously stated in the context section of this article, the financial rewards available to 
professional football clubs have increased exponentially in recent years. Each position in the 
EPL is worth at least an estimated £750,000 and promotion to the league itself is worth an 
estimated £120m with at least £60m of that guaranteed upfront. There is little doubt that 
financial factors will play a part in the dismissal of a football manager and research by Flint 
et al., (2014) found that the clubs threatened by relegation (i.e. clubs that were in the bottom 
half of the table) improved their position by dismissing a manager. The financial rewards 
argument is not merely exclusively to the bottom half of the table however. Qualification for 
European competition can bring with it increased financial rewards and the decision to 
change a manager for clubs that generally tend to compete in the top half of the table is often 




Indeed, UEFA distributed a total of €904.6m in prize money to all clubs that competed in the 
Champions League for the latest set of figures available (2013/14). The winners of this 
competition, Real Madrid, earned the most in prize money (€57.4m) with the runners up, 
Atletico Madrid, receiving €50m. Of the English clubs that competed in the Champions 
League in 2013/14 Arsenal and Manchester City reached the last 16 whilst Manchester 
United reached the quarter-finals and Chelsea the semi-finals. This performance meant that 
these four clubs gained prize money of €27.2m (Arsenal), €35.4m (Manchester City), €44.7m 
(Manchester United) and €43.4m (Chelsea). In light of these figures it is suggested that the 
financial rewards of sporting performance add a further uncontrollable factor for professional 
football managers. A further caveat that outlines the insecurity of the football manager's job 
is that even the most sought after success does always guarantee continued employment. 
Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich has made no secret of his desire to win the Champions 
League since he took over ownership of the club in 2003. In 2012, Roberto Di Matteo led 
Chelsea to the final of the Champions League where they defeated Bayern Munich on 
penalties to secure their first ever European Cup. The resulting outcome for Di Matteo was 
not an extended contract or pay-related bonus but rather a termination of his contract to make 
way for the return of Jose Mourinho. 
 
Fans 
The influence that fans can have on their club and the pressure that they exert on the 
managerial structure is perhaps best referenced through the link to the supporters trust model 
of ownership which is the third main ownership structure relevant to EPL clubs (Walters and 
Hamil, 2010). According to Walters and Hamil (2010), the supporter trust model of 
ownership has grown in strength since 2000 when the Labour government backed the 
establishment of an organisation called Supporters Direct, whose remit was to promote the 
trust concept. A statement on the Supporters Direct website states that "we exist because we 
are needed: the game can be better run and should be more responsive to the needs of its fans 
and local communities" (Supporters Direct). Notable examples of clubs that have followed 
this model of ownership include Swansea City, FC United of Manchester, AFC Wimbledon 
and further back in time Exeter City and Brentford. Within these clubs, the fans as directors 
had an influence over the selection of the manager. However, the supporters trust model has 
yet to prove its applicability to the EPL. Indeed, Brown (2007: 617) infers that such a model 
has "totally failed to demonstrate how it can work in a company the size of Manchester 
United where major corporate finance is needed to create a meaningful stake". Whilst fans of 
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EPL clubs may not have a direct impact on the decision to hire or fire a manager, it is 
established that they have a passive impact on the outcome. Terrace chants such as "you're 
getting sacked in the morning" are often heard as a response to poor performance (an 
aforementioned controllable factor) and place added pressure on the board of directors to act 
as the fans contribute significantly towards the clubs in relation to revenue. 
 
What is important to note is that management in the EPL is very different and somewhat 
incomparable to other forms employment in the UK, primarily because of the finances 
involved in this sport. For example, as highlighted in this article, there are many 
uncontrollable factors that may lead to managerial change. One of the basic rules of working 
as a psychologist in performance related activity is for the client to focus on the controllable 
factors of their performance and by doing so, to some degree, dealing with these controllable 
factors is all that can be asked of a performer. However, the influence that uncontrollable 
factors have on a manager's position at an EPL club is likely to have an impact on their tenure. 
For example, media hype when a manager is under pressure due to a string of poor 
performances is likely to influence the fan base and collaboratively increase pressure on club 
stakeholders to consider managerial change. 
 
Employee dismissal in the UK 
Essentially there are four means of employee dismissal in the UK which all employers by law 
are expected to meet (HM Government, 2014). The first is 'fair dismissals' where there is a 
valid reason for terminating an employment contract. Fair dismissals refer to an employee's 
incapability to perform their duties to the required standard, that despite their capability they 
do not perform their duties, due to misconduct, redundancy, or if the employee is legally 
unable to perform their duties (e.g., loss of driving licence). Second is 'unfair dismissals' 
which occurs when the employee believes the reason for dismissal is unfair, that the 
employer has acted unreasonably when dismissing the employee (e.g., inadequate notice to 
warn the employee of their dismissal), or if the reason for dismissal was not the real reason. It 
should be noted here, that despite acting reasonably, unfair dismissal does not allow the 
employer to dismiss an individual unless there is a valid reason. For example, a fixed-term 
employee cannot be dismissed unless the employer has a valid reason for terminating their 
contract. Third is constructive dismissal which refers to the employee resigning due to a 
breach in their employment contract such as a cut in their wages that has not been agreed, 
unfairly increasing their workload or changing the location of the workplace at short notice. 
14 
 
Fourth is wrongful dismissal which refers to a break in the dismissal process of an employee's 
contract, for example not giving the employee proper notice (HM Government, 2014). 
 
General discussion 
With reference to the four means of employee dismissal above, managerial change based on 
performance would fall into fair dismissal as despite their capabilities they fail to perform 
their duties. However, given that most if not all managerial change in the English Premier 
League is an instant dismissal and therefore there is inadequate notice to warn the employee 
of their dismissal. The length of employment dictates the period of notice that employers 
legally need to provide. According to the Employment Rights Act (1996), if an employer 
terminates an employee’s contract who has been employed for one month or more, the notice 
period must: not be less than one week if the period of continuous employment is less than 
two years; not be less than one week for each year of continuous employment if this period is 
two years or more but less than twelve years; or not be less than twelve weeks’ if the period 
of continuous employment is twelve years or more. Thus, given the instability of managers in 
the EPL and the amount of sackings that have occurred between one month and two years of 
appointment, clubs should give the manager one weeks’ notice. However, there is a loop hole 
in the Employment Rights Act, 1996), which is how clubs are able to dismiss a manager 
instantly: 
 
“Any provision for shorter notice in any contract of employment with a person who has been 
continuously employed for one month or more… this section does not prevent either party 
from waiving his right to notice on any occasion or from accepting a payment in lieu of 
notice”. 
 
This more recently has led to a large pay off for the outgoing manager as the contract has 
been breached by the employer. Whilst this ‘pay off’ is agreed between the employer and 
employee and is lawful in line with the Employment Rights Act (1996), ethically there is a 
question as to whether the employer should be permitted to act in this way, essentially 
bypassing the stated four means of employee dismissal in the UK. The money involved in the 
EPL has allowed clubs to dismiss managers instantly in this way, which whilst needs to be 




Instances of wrongful dismissal in the EPL have been noted previously. For example, whilst 
manager of West Ham United, Alan Curbishley was granted ultimate sole authority in 
relation to the same and purchase of players in his contract. However, against the wishes of 
Curbishley, the club sold players Anton Ferdinand and George McCartney to Sunderland, a 
move that saw Curbishley resign from his post and take the matter to court. The Tribunal 
upheld Curbishley's claim of wrongful dismissal due to the breach of contract. Whilst this 
example doesn't necessarily provide a direct instance of the club sacking a manager, the fact 
that the club acted outside of the contracted agreement led to Curbishley's resignation which 
he was entitled to do based on the clubs actions (League Managers Association, 2009). 
 
However, this is the case in relation to fair dismissal where the employee is unable to perform 
their duties to the required standard, which is not always the cause of managerial change in 
the EPL. In some instances, managerial change may occur despite achieving the duties of the 
role such as pressure from club supporters (Walters and Hamilton, 2010). Whilst much has 
been made about the sums of money involved in player transfers with in many cases finance 
the driving force, instant managerial change also appears to be made possible due to the 
finances involved in the decision. It is unlikely that this would occur in any other form of 
employment in the UK, where an employee is not given their full notice, warning them of 
them of their dismissal or that they can work the statutory notice period. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the recent findings of Flint et al. (2014) who reported that managerial sackings for 
clubs in the bottom half of the English Premier League is beneficial, greater consideration 
appears to be warranted relating to the ethical issues in relation to human rights as stated in 
this article. EPL clubs appear to sack their manager instantly, which is a violation of the 
statutory notice period. Ethically, the human rights of managers may have been removed by 
allowing clubs to use their finances to implement instant managerial change. Furthermore, 
there are uncontrollable factors that may cause managerial change that fall outside of what 
constitutes fair dismissal. Managerial change has and will continue to be discussed by the 
media and from a research perspective remains a topic for enquiry. Yet whilst the focus of 
research enquiry has focused on how managerial change impacts performance related 
outcomes, there remains a question as to whether the current practices seen in the EPL are 
ethically and morally correct.  The implications for the individual in this decision are not 
primary priority for EPL clubs, whether that may be the impact of the job loss and breaking 
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bonds with a club, how this effects future prospects and the potential of relocation as a 
consequence. 
 
The instability of managing an EPL club which managers are explicitly aware of in this 
competition is likely to impact quality of life. A window mirroring that which is now 
enforced for player transfers has been also been suggested for managers which would 
certainly provide more stability to a club and reduce the anxiety of knowing that any day you 
may lose your job. A question posed but not answered to date, is why players have the right 
to a transfer window but managers don't? There are clearly many questions to be considered 
in relation to managerial change in the EPL, some of which have been highlighted as part of 
this article. Thus, this article should therefore be used as a stimulus for future debate and 
research enquiry. In sum, we have provided a thought-provoking account of the ethical and in 
some instances legal issues relevant to managerial change that is often overlooked when 
examining this topic. The fact remains as noted by Sir Matt Busby that "the sack is an 
occupational hazard. I do not care what system football is suffering from at any time on the 
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